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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. How Absolute is the “Absolute Pollution Exclusion?”
The Answer is Not Always so Clear.
Imagine a hypothetical situation where you are carrying a few
bags of groceries into your house. Suddenly, the bag holding your
extra-large bottle of bleach rips open. The bleach bottle falls out and
hits the ground with enough force to break open the plastic
container. A wave of bleach washes over your carpeting. The
damage is done before you think to throw down a towel.
As you watch the color leave your carpet (and your towels), you
realize the damage is significant and most likely will be costly. Your
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carpeting is ruined, and you wonder if you can afford to replace it. 1
After briefly considering strategically placing area rugs to hide the
vast constellation of stains, “Aha!” you think, “I’ll see if my
insurance will cover new carpeting.” Many would simply call their
agent or insurer, having long since lost or tossed the copy of the
policy they were given ages ago. If, however, homeowners did
happen to glance at their homeowners insurance policies, they
might be surprised to see language denying coverage for this loss
because it was caused by a “pollutant.” 2 Language in an insurance
1. As a preliminary aside, losses involving hazardous materials, pollutants,
chemicals, and other harmful substances can often cause tremendous damage.
This is because liability arises not only from the physical loss itself (i.e., the
physical damage to property or people caused by exposure to the substance), but
also from ensuing losses (i.e., tort liability for negligence, or statutory penalties
for violating applicable environmental laws and regulations). Ron Bousso, BP
Deepwater Horizon Costs Balloon to $65 billion, REUTERS, (Jan. 16, 2018),
www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-deepwaterhorizon/bp-deepwater-horizon-costsballoon-to-65-billion-idUSKBN1F50NL (noting an early $19 billion settlement
of federal and state claims (relating to cleanup, fines, and fees), and continued
litigation over the most complex claims within the Court Supervised Settlement
Program nearly 8 years after the spill).
For the purposes of this hypothetical example involving spilled bleach, it is
safe to assume that the damage would require total replacement of the
carpeting in at least the affected room. Other factors, like whether there are
natural “breaks” in the carpeting (e.g., thresholds between rooms), and whether
the old carpet could even be matched with the new, might increase the amount
of the loss far beyond its appearance. Damage Evaluation Guidelines, TEXAS
WINDSTORM INS. ASS’N & TEXAS FAIR PLAN 15 (2014), twia.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/2-Property-Damage-Evaluation-Guidelines.pdf
(stating that “[t]he Field Claims Adjuster should allow for repairs to adjoining
areas if there is no natural break between the damaged and undamaged areas,”
and that “[a] Field Claims Adjuster should consider whether or not any
significant diminution in market value can be avoided by providing for matched
shingles, siding, or components for single or multiple slopes, sides, or areas
within a line of sight”).
2. One common example of the pollution exclusion can be found in an
industry standard homeowners insurance policy. The HO3 form drafted and
promulgated by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) states the following with
respect to the provision of coverage for “pollution”:
SECTION I – PERILS INSURED AGAINST
Coverage A – Dwelling And Coverage B –
Other Structures
2. We do not insure, however, for loss:
c. Caused by:
(6) Any of the following:
(e) Discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
pollutants unless the discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or
escape is itself caused by a Peril Insured Against named under Coverage
C.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or

2019]

Construing the Pollution Exclusion in Illinois

807

policy that denies coverage for certain kinds of losses is often called
an “exclusion.”3 The exclusion in this situation is known in the
insurance industry as the “Absolute Pollution Exclusion”
(hereinafter “APE”).4
Yet the APE is often not absolute. The APE in the homeowners
policy explicitly and literally disclaims coverage for losses caused by
the “release” of “pollutants,” and defines “pollutant” to include
“alkalis.”5 Unfortunately for the hypothetical homeowner above,
this means that there might not be coverage for the accidental
bleach spill. This is because the cause of the loss seems to be
attributable to the “release” of bleach, which technically meets the
definition of a “pollutant.”
Yet Illinois insurers (and scrupulous insurers everywhere)
would likely pay the claim described above despite the strong
wording found within the exclusion. 6 This paradox is attributable
to what one court described as the outcome of pollution exclusion

contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste.
Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.”
Ins. Servs. Office Props., Inc., Homeowners 3 – Special Form, HO 00 03 05 11
(found in LEO P. MARTINEZ & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON INS. LAW 1037, Appendix D (7th ed. 2013) [hereinafter MARTINEZ AND
RICHMOND].
3. Id. at 1000 (defining “Exclusion” as “an insurance policy provision that
denies coverage for certain perils, persons, property, or locations”).
4. Id. at 179 (noting that “’absolute pollution exclusions’ are ubiquitous
among modern insurance policies”). Coverage the insurance policy gives in one
section may be curtailed in a later section of the policy. In my personal
experience as a claims adjuster I heard another adjuster once say that “the
policy giveth and the policy taketh away.” This is one reason that it is often
difficult for the uninitiated to read an insurance policy.
Because knowing how to read an insurance policy is a skill that is beyond
the scope of this article, it is sufficient for readers to simply know and
understand terms like “coverage,” “exclusion,” “liability,” and other terms of art
in insurance law. This is because this comment reviews the APE generally, not
in the specific context of one insurance policy. Accordingly, it is not necessary
to know how to jump between the sections of a policy to perform a coverage
analysis in order to understand how Illinois treats the APE.
5. See MARTINEZ AND RICHMOND, supra note 2 and accompanying text for
an example of the language of the APE (which excludes coverage for losses
caused by “pollutants” like those listed in the policy, which often include
“alkalis” like bleach). See, e.g., Image Linen Services, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 5:09CV-149-OC-10GRJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24420 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2011)
(describing a product containing bleach used by a commercial laundry as an
“alkali detergent bleach soap and softener”). See also Monadnock Mills v.
Fushey, 224 F. 386 (1st Cir. N.H. 1915) (describing “bleaching” as a “process
effected by an alkali solution, caused to circulate through the fabric…”).
6. Illinois interprets the APE to be limited to “traditional environmental
contamination,” and spilling bleach on the carpet cannot be thought of as
“traditional environmental contamination.” See American States Ins. Co. v.
Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 494 (1997) (holding that Illinois interprets the APE to
be limited to “traditional environmental contamination”).
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litigation: not just a split of authority, but a veritable
“fragmentation of authority.”7 Despite the high volume of litigation
addressing the APE, no clear consensus has formed around a proper
interpretation.8 However, in jurisdictions with fewer domestic
insurers and polluters, litigation of the APE can be rare. This leads
advocates and judges to look to jurisdictions with more active APE
litigation, such as Illinois.9

B. Narrative Outline
This comment reviews Illinois judicial decisions regarding the
APE. Illinois is a jurisdiction with a high volume of APE litigation.
At the same time, many other jurisdictions have very little
experience interpreting, litigating, and applying the APE.10
Consequently, Illinois’ interpretation of the APE is a more
significant source of legal authority than a state like Mississippi,
which has comparatively little APE litigation. 11 Because of this,
Illinois’ interpretation of the APE offers persuasive authority for
the numerous jurisdictions that handle APE issues with less
frequency than Illinois.12 In short, the way Illinois treats the APE
7. RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFERY W. STEMPEL, GEN. LIABILITY INS.
COVERAGE, § 15.00 (Jeffery W. Stempel ed., 3rd ed. 2006) [hereinafter
MANILOFF & STEMPEL] (quoting Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d
789, 800 (Ala. 2002) (describing litigation of the APE: “there exists not just a
split of authority, but an absolute fragmentation of authority”)).
8. Alison Frankel, New Illinois Supreme Court Ruling Should Make
‘Judicial
Hellhole’
Less
Fiery,
REUTERS
(Sept.
25,
2017),
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-illinois/new-illinois-supreme-courtruling-should-make-judicial-hellhole-less-fiery-idUSKCN1C02OC (stating that
nearly one-third of all asbestos litigation occurs in Madison County courts).
9. Sulphuric Acid Trading Co. Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 243,
248 (Tenn. App. Ct. 2006) (looking to Illinois case law on the APE in order to
resolve a coverage dispute governed by Tennessee authority because “[t]he
parties and this Court have been unable to locate any Tennessee authority
discussing the Absolute Pollution Exclusion contained in comprehensive
general liability policies such as the one at issue in the present case”). This
illustrates one of the key points of this comment, which is that many
jurisdictions look to Illinois for APE issues simply because Illinois has more
experience dealing with APE issues than many other jurisdictions. Illinois’
interpretation of the APE is therefore significant because other states look to
Illinois for compelling authority on the APE.
10. Mississippi, for example, has just two cases on the books regarding the
pollution exclusion: Colony Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Corp., 262 So. 3d 1128
(Miss. 2019) and Forbes v. Louis St. Martin, 145 So. 3d 1184 (Miss. Ct. App.
2013).
11. Illinois has approximately 53 absolute pollution exclusion cases
according to a database search for “absolute pollution exclusion” conducted on
Lexis Nexis on October 18, 2018.
12. A database search conducted on October 18, 2018 using Lexis Nexis’s
Shephard’s feature shows 25 states and the District of Colombia have cited
Koloms, an Illinois Supreme Court APE case discussed at length in this
comment. In other words, half of the states in the country have examined a
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influences the way smaller jurisdictions treat the APE.
Despite the fragmentation of authority on the APE, Illinois
plays an important role in APE litigation. Illinois’ fragment is larger
than other jurisdictions.13 This comment reviews how and why this
fragmented, state-centric system came to be, and discusses an
ambiguity that has arisen in APE cases involving permitted
emissions.14 By way of background, APE litigation draws upon
combined principles of insurance law and environmental law. These
principles are introduced below.15 This comment also presents the
history of the APE and the previously mentioned fragmentation of
insurance authority.
Furthermore, this comment proposes that Illinois courts
formally recognize that the APE is ambiguous when it is applied to
permitted emissions or other lawful releases of pollutants. This will
have the effect of providing coverage for losses arising from
permitted activity (such as a lawsuit alleging a permitted pig-farm
has polluted a well despite complying with the terms of its permit).
As this comment demonstrates, this proposal is consistent with
Illinois Supreme Court case law and has indeed already been
adopted by the Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeals. This
proposal is also consistent with a public policy to encourage
compliance with environmental laws, and a policy to encourage the
purchasing of insurance.

ruling by Illinois’ highest court on Illinois’ interpretation of the APE.
13. See, e.g., Sulphuric Acid Trading, 211 S.W.3d at 248 (looking to Illinois
case law on the APE in order to resolve a coverage dispute governed by
Tennessee authority because “[t]he parties and this Court have been unable to
locate any Tennessee authority discussing the Absolute Pollution Exclusion
contained in comprehensive general liability policies such as the one at issue in
the present case”).
14. For the purposes of the discussion in this comment, “permitted
emissions” mean those for which a permit has been granted by an
environmental enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the insured.
15. This comment deals exclusively with the APE. Accordingly, it is beyond
the scope of this comment to engage in an exhaustive analysis of the background
principles of insurance law and environmental law. Where possible, the author
has attempted to elucidate pertinent operative principles within these domains
of law. There sources cited herein are valuable resources for those interested in
learning more about the basic elements of the law operating in the background
of the APE.
Those with little or no knowledge of insurance contracts, administrative
environmental law, or the statutes governing these areas of the law may be
unfamiliar with the terminology and concepts used in this comment. Space does
not permit a full discussion of each term that might be unfamiliar to such
readers, so please understand that this article is geared towards insurance and
environmental practitioners, and those curious about the subject matter.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Narrative Outline of Background Topics
This section begins with a discussion of the history of the statecentric insurance regulatory system. This system gives rise to the
fragmentation of authority present not just in APE issues, but
across the entire spectrum of insurance jurisprudence in the United
States. The history of the pollution exclusion is examined next,
followed by a summary of the leading case addressing the APE in
Illinois. Finally, pertinent environmental laws and regulations are
introduced to complete the framework within which the APE exists.

B. The Fragmentation of Authority Governing
Insurance (or Why State Law Controls)
Various states have adopted nuanced and often sharply
divergent interpretations of the APE, resulting in a fragmentation
of authority.16 In order to understand the significance of a particular
state’s interpretation of the APE, or any given insurance policy
provision for that matter, it is helpful to understand why states are
in the business of regulating insurance in the first place.
After all, comparably situated industries like the banking and
pharmaceutical sectors are subject to regulation by numerous
independent federal agencies, such as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation,17 the Securities and Exchange
Commission,18 and the Food and Drug Administration. 19 The
insurance industry occupies a sizeable portion of the gross domestic
product of the United States20 and employs millions of people.21
Despite its size and importance, the business of insurance is mostly
16. MANILOFF AND STEMPEL, supra note 7 (quoting Porterfield, 856 So. 2d
at 800) (describing litigation of the APE: “there exists not just a split of
authority, but an absolute fragmentation of authority”)).
17. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq.
(1993) (creating the FDIC and subjecting “banks” and various other financial
institutions as defined in the act to the requirements therein).
18. Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2016)
(establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission and subjecting
regulated entities to measures designed to protect investors).
19. Food and Drug Administration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2011) (establishing
the Food and Drug Administration and subjecting food and medical products to
approval and review by the Administration).
20. Insurance Spending, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
data.oecd.org/insurance/insurance-spending.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2019)
(estimating that insurance spending in the United States represents 11.28% of
total gross domestic product).
21. Insurance Carriers and Related Activities, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.,
www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag524.htm (last visited April 1, 2019) (estimating the
insurance industry employed approximately 2.6 million people during the
month of August 2017).
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unregulated at the federal level.22 There is a notable exception the
federal program colloquially known as “Obamacare.” 23 The National
Flood Insurance Program, administered by the federal government,
is another example of the federal government’s limited role in the
insurance sector.24
But despite these two limited examples, insurance is mostly
statutorily exempt from federal regulation under the McCarran–
Ferguson Act.25 The law provides that “[t]he business of insurance,
and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the
several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.”26
1. Paul v. Virginia and the Early Development of the StateBased Insurance Regulatory System
From the Civil War to World War II, Congress thought that
insurance was not “commerce” and thus could not regulate it
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 27 This was the conclusion of the
Supreme Court in Paul v. Virginia.28 In Paul, the State of Virginia
had enacted a law requiring insurers not incorporated under the
laws of Virginia to obtain license to operate their business in the
State.29 According to the arguments of counsel presented at the
head of the case, Paul, an insurance agent in Virginia, issued a fire
insurance policy written by a foreign corporation (meaning one not

22. MARTINEZ AND RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 52 (stating that “Congress
has delegated broad authority to state legislatures in defining the scope and
subject-matter of state insurance regulation”).
23. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq.
(2010).
24. National Flood Insurance Act, 40 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (1994).
25. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945).
26. Id. at § 1012(a).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate
commerce between the states).
28. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1869) (holding that “[i]ssuing a policy
of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.” The Supreme Court goes on to
explain that “policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss . . . entered
into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the
latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce . . . They are not subjects of
trade and barter offered in the market . . . They are not commodities to be
shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and then put up for sale. They
are like other personal contracts between parties . . . Such contracts are not
inter-state transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different States.
The policies do not take effect -- are not executed contracts -- until delivered by
the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by
the local law. They do not constitute a part of the commerce between the States
any more than a contract for the purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a
citizen of New York whilst in Virginia would constitute a portion of such
commerce.”) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 177.
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incorporated under the laws of Virginia).30 He was convicted under
the state law and appealed all the way to the Supreme Court,
arguing that his conviction violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause31 and the Commerce Clause32 of the U.S. Constitution.33
Paul reasoned that requiring a non-domestic insurance
corporation to obtain a license where no license was required for
domestic insurers violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 34
This argument required assuming that corporations are “citizens,”
which the Supreme Court was unwilling to do at the time.35 More
importantly, Paul argued Congress had the authority to regulate
insurance under the Commerce Clause.36 The Supreme Court also
rejected this argument.37 By ruling that insurance was not
commerce, the Court sent a clear signal that insurance was not
subject to Congress’ power to regulate under the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court would maintain its position, first
expressed in Paul, for seventy-five years. The ruling in Paul, that
insurance was not commerce, was consequently interpreted to mean
that insurance regulation was to be left entirely to State
governments.38 It was not until United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association that the Court had a radical change of
heart on the question of whether insurance was within the capacity
of Congress’ power to regulate commerce.39
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (providing that “[t]he citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states”).
32. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”).
33. Paul, 75 U.S. at 168-77 (syllabus).
34. Id. Paul essentially argues that requiring a non-domestic insurer to do
something that a domestic insurer does not have to do deprives the nondomestic insurer of a privilege granted to the domestic insurer.
35. Id. at 177 (finding that “corporations are not citizens within [the
meaning of the privileges and immunities clauses],” and further explaining that
“[t]he term citizens as there used applies only to natural persons, members of
the body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created
by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has
prescribed”).
36. Id. at 168-77.
37. Id. at 183 (rejecting the argument that insurance was subject to
regulation under the commerce clause because insurance policies are not
commodities moved between states, but rather locally made contracts, and are
therefore not “commerce”).
38. DANIEL MALDONADO ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 2:4 - McCarranFerguson Act, (Westlaw, 3d ed. 201) (explaining that the consequence of Paul
was that “the regulation of the insurance industry was thought to rest
exclusively within the control of the States”).
39. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533,
583 (1944) (Justice Stone noting in his dissent that the majority’s decision in
South-Eastern Underwriters overturned 75 years of precedent.) (Justice
Jackson noting in his dissent-in-part that the majority was “making
unprecedented use of the Act to strike down the constitutional basis of state
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2. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the McCarranFerguson Act, and the Formalized State-Based Insurance
Regulatory System
The South-Eastern Underwriters Association (the “SEUA”)
was an industry group composed of almost 200 stock fire insurance
companies that was indicted for violations of the Sherman AntiTrust Act.40 The crux of the Sherman violations were that the SEUA
and its members had conspired to fix the price of fire and other
insurance in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia, and had conspired to monopolize the
insurance market in those states.41 The Sherman Act makes it a
violation to engage in conspiracies to fix prices or monopolize
trade.42 The conspiracy employed by the SEUA, in what can only be
described as a textbook Sherman Act violation,43 took the form of
open and notorious boycotts, coercion, and intimidation directed at
forcing non-members into the conspiracy and forcing those who
needed insurance to buy only from SEUA members. 44 The cartel
was extremely effective, controlling ninety percent of the markets
in which it operated.45
Naturally, the SEUA argued that it was not subject to the
Sherman Act because its insurance business was not commerce and
thus did not fall under the Sherman Act or the Commerce Clause
(citing the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Paul that issuing a policy
of insurance is not a transaction of commerce).46 The Court had
clarified things even further in subsequent cases, explicitly holding
that insurance was not commerce.47 Mysteriously, the Court in
South-Eastern again reiterated that insurance is not necessarily

regulation”).
40. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
41. Id. at 534-35.
42. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2004) (making it a
crime to engage in conspiracies to fix prices). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (making it
a crime to monopolize a trade).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 make it a crime to engage in conspiracies to fix
prices and to monopolize a trade, respectively. The SEUA, as a cartel of
similarly interested insurance companies, conspired to fix prices and to
monopolize the insurance trade in the Southeastern United States. This is
exactly what the Sherman Act forbade.
44. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 535.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 546-48.
47. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1895) (reaffirming Paul and
broadening its core holding by adding that “[t]he business of insurance is not
commerce”). See also New York Life Insurance Company v. Deer Lodge County,
231 U.S. 495, 503-04, 510 (1913) (again reaffirming Paul and stating that
“contracts of insurance are not commerce at all, neither state nor interstate”).
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interstate commerce.48 Then the Court essentially overturned the
core holding in Paul by holding that insurance is subject to
regulation by Congress under the commerce clause. 49 The decision
was handed down on Monday, June 5, 1944. 50 On the very next day,
June 6, 1944, known as “D-Day,” Allied Forces stormed the beaches
of Normandy in the largest seaborne invasion in history. 51
The effect of the holding in South-Eastern Underwriters was
two-fold: it subjected the insurance industry to governmentimposed liability for antitrust violations,52 but in so doing it also
upset the state-centric regulatory system that had governed the
business of insurance since the industry’s infancy in the United
States.53 Well aware of the implications in overturning Paul, 35
states filed amicus curiae briefs unanimously in favor of upholding
Paul and shielding SEUA from Sherman Act liability. 54 Industry
groups like the SEUA had become prevalent in the state-centric
regulatory system, where the sort of competition encouraged by the
Sherman Act was seen as detrimental to the interests of insurance
customers.55 Despite this, the Supreme Court gave Congress little
48. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 546-47 (granting “that a
contract of insurance, considered as a thing apart from negotiation and
execution, does not itself constitute interstate commerce”).
49. Id. at 552-53 (holding that the business of insurance is not excepted from
the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
50. Id. at 533.
51. ANTONY BEEVOR, D-DAY: THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 74 (2009).
52. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 562 (holding the Sherman Act
applies to the business of insurance based on the principle that Congress may
regulate the business of insurance as “commerce” under the Commerce Clause).
53. Id. at 561 (acknowledging that “it is argued at great length that virtually
all the states regulate the insurance business on the theory that competition in
the field of insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and
that if the Sherman Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state
regulation will be destroyed.” The court then chose to ignore that argument
because “[w]hether competition is a good thing for the insurance business is not
for us to consider. Having power to enact the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if
exceptions are to be written into the Act, they must come from the Congress,
not this Court.”).
54. Id. at 533 (stating in the syllabus that “[b]riefs were filed (1) on behalf
of the States of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and West
Virginia, and (2) on behalf of the State of Virginia, as amici curiae, urging
affirmance”).
55. The Court acknowledged this state of affairs, which was essentially
mandated by its decision in Paul, in South-Eastern Underwriters:
“[I]t is argued at great length that virtually all the states regulate the
insurance business on the theory that competition in the field of
insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and that
if the Sherman Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state
regulation will be destroyed. The first part of this argument is buttressed
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choice but to act. And it did so at the height of World War II. 56
Essentially, the Supreme Court decision ordered Congress to write
a law that would provide a national insurance system. This was
short-sighted because Congress was busy with the far more
important matter of World War II. A comprehensive piece of
legislation on the scale of those regulating the banking and
financial industries was simply not going to happen.
Congress, left with little alternative, drafted and enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act within 10 months of the Supreme Court’s
decision in South-Eastern Underwriters.57 Rather than create an
independent federal agency as the Court might have been
encouraging, Congress explicitly turned over regulation of the
business of insurance to the States. 58 This codification of the statecentric system has enabled, and indeed encouraged States to go
their own way ever since.59 Simply put, any given State’s
interpretation of an insurance policy provision is given controlling
authority within that State’s jurisdiction (and can thus be used as
persuasive authority by other courts).60 This is why a State’s
interpretation of a given insurance policy provision, such as the
APE, can be extremely significant. The State’s interpretation, as the
interpretation of the governing authority, often controls the crucial

by opinions expressed by various persons that unrestricted competition
in insurance results in financial chaos and public injury. Whether
competition is a good thing for the insurance business is not for us to
consider. Having power to enact the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if
exceptions are to be written into the Act, they must come from the
Congress, not this Court.”
Id. at 561.
56. In his dissenting opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters, Justice
Jackson questioned the timing of the decision “at a time like this,” presumably
in reference to Congress having better things to do during the middle of World
War II than draft national insurance legislation:
“To force the hand of Congress is no more the proper function of the
judiciary than to tie the hands of Congress. To use my office, at a time
like this, and with so little justification in necessity, to dislocate the
functions and revenues of the states and to catapult Congress into
immediate and undivided responsibility for supervision of the nation's
insurance businesses is more than I can reconcile with my view of the
function of this Court in our society.”
Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
57. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
58. Id. § 1012.
59. MARTINEZ AND RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 52 (stating that “[u]nder the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress has delegated broad authority to state
legislatures in defining the scope and subject-matter of state insurance
regulation”)
60. Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Phusion Projects, Inc., 737 F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th
Cir. 2010) (applying Illinois law) (noting that Illinois law applies to the
interpretation of the policy at issue).
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question of whether a loss is covered.61

C. History of the Pollution Exclusion
Before 1966, Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policies
afforded coverage for bodily injury or property damage “caused by
accident.”62 The pre-1966 CGL policy did not define “accident,”
leading to uncertainty as to whether pollution (or its costs) were
covered under the CGL policy.63 Some courts did not consider
gradual pollution to be “accidental” in the strict meaning of the
word.64 But many courts construed the term broadly, finding
coverage for “accidents” such as oil spills lasting several days, 65
gasoline leaking into a well,66 and even the cracking and settling of
a building foundation after months of excavation and construction
on an adjacent property.67 Insurance companies redrafted their
policies in 1966 to provide coverage on an “occurrence” basis. 68 This
change is typically understood to have broadened coverage
available under the CGL.69
After noting its growing liability for environmental litigation,
the insurance industry introduced the standard pollution exclusion
in 1970.70 The standard pollution exclusion disclaimed coverage for
61. See Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473 at 479 (stating that the interpreting of an
insurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo review).
62. Id. at 489 (quoting Ctr. for Creative Studs. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 871
F. Supp. 941, 943 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
63. Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990)
(explaining that while it (the Wisconsin Supreme Court) had ruled in Clark v.
London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 268, that gradual pollution was
not covered under the CGL policy, other jurisdictions had reached the opposite
conclusion).
64. See Clark, 21 Wis. 2d at 283 (finding a pre-1966 CGL policy afforded no
coverage for nuisance claim brought against insured for allowing his gravel pit
to be used as a dump site because “[i]n the instant case the long exposure to
injury by the obnoxious fumes was caused not only by the dumping operations
but also by plaintiff's failure over many months to take effective steps to abate
the nuisance. It necessarily follows that the damages were not "caused by
accident" within the meaning of the policy.”).
65. Cas. Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949) (finding coverage for
damage to neighboring properties caused by the flow of oil over two days).
66. Emprs. Ins. Co. v. Rives, 264 Ala. 310 (Ala. 1955) (holding that the
gradual leaking of gasoline from an underground tank into a nearby well was a
covered accident).
67. McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. 1975)
(deciding in favor of coverage for accidental damage to structure caused by
nearby excavating and construction of buildings).
68. Morton Int'l v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 134 N.J. 1, 32 (N.J. 1993).
(explaining that the newly redrafted CGL policy defined “occurrence” as “an
accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage that was neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured”).
69. Id. at 33.
70. Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 140 N.H. 780, 782 (N.H. 1996)
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discharges into land, air, or water that were not sudden and
accidental.71 Litigation over the standard pollution exclusion
centered on the words “sudden and accidental,” which was often
determined to be ambiguous.72 The finding of ambiguity within an
insurance policy often resulted in the application of the doctrine of
contra proferentem, whereby the ambiguity is interpreted against
the drafter.73 The insurance industry redrafted the pollution
exclusion again in 1986, resulting in what is now known as the
absolute pollution exclusion or APE. 74

D. Illinois Interpretation of the Absolute Pollution
Exclusion
Illinois has emerged as one of the nation’s most significant
contributors to the national insurance industry. 75 Illinois exercises
an extra degree of influence on insurance because there are multiple
insurance companies within its borders.76 One state-funded study
identified 192 property and casualty insurers, 39 life insurers, and
41 health insurers based in Illinois. 77 The presence of so many
insurers has led, in some circumstances, to a significant amount of
insurance litigation. Madison County, Illinois, for instance, is home
to approximately one-third of all the asbestos related litigation in
the United States, ranking it among the most active asbestos

(explaining that “[t]he standard pollution exclusion, introduced in 1970,
eliminated coverage for damages arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of irritants, contaminants, or pollutants into the air, water, or land,
except when the discharge was sudden and accidental”)
71. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4524 at 143-44
(Supp. 1997).
72. Id.
73. Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 N.J. 87, 95 n.3 (N.J.
2004) (found in MARTINEZ AND RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 142) (noting that
“[t]he doctrine of contra proferentem requires that an ambiguous provision of a
written document "is construed most strongly against the person who selected
the language").
74. Weaver, 140 N.H. at 782 (noting that the redrafted exclusion
“eliminate[d] the exception for ‘sudden and accidental’ pollution and . . .
omit[ted] language requiring the discharge to be ‘into the air, water, or land,’
resulting in what has been termed an ‘absolute’ exclusion”).
75. The Economic Impact of the Insurance Industry in Illinois: 2016 Study,
KATIE SCH. OF INS. & FIN. SERVS. AT IL STATE UNIV. (2016),
insurance.illinois.gov/newsrls/2016/04/Economic
ImpactOfTheInsuranceIndustryInIL.pdf (noting that one-fifth of every property
casual premium is underwritten in Illinois (likely due to the high number of
domestic domiciled insurers)) [hereinafter 2016 Katie School Study].
76. Corilyn Shropshire, 50 Illinois Companies Land on Annual Fortune 500
List, CHI. TRIB. (June 7, 2017), www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-fortune500-illinois-companies-0608-biz-2-20170607-story.html (noting that Allstate
and State-Farm, two of the largest insurers in the country, are headquartered
in Illinois).
77. 2016 Katie School Study, supra note 75.
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litigation dockets in the country.78 Because Illinois has a large body
of insurance case law, there is an increased likelihood that other
states, where courts are less experienced in insurance matters, will
turn to Illinois insurance decisions for guidance.79
The most recent Illinois Supreme Court decision addressing
the APE is American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms. In Koloms, a
furnace in a multistory commercial building in Lake County began
emitting “carbon monoxide and other noxious fumes.” 80 Employees
of one of the tenants in the building became ill, and six of the
affected employees sued Harvey and Nina Koloms as the building
owners.81 The complaint against the Koloms alleged that they had
negligently maintained the furnace.82
The Koloms notified their insurance company, American
States Insurance Company (hereinafter ASI), which agreed to
defend the Koloms, subject to a reservation of its right to contest
coverage under the APE contained in the Koloms’ insurance
policy.83 Commonly called a “reservation of rights” (“ROR”),
insurance companies employ RORs to shield themselves from
liability for failing to uphold obligations under the insurance
policy.84 When an insurer reserves its rights in a letter to its
insured, it is attempting to avoid the application of the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel; “when an insurer defends a claim against its
insured under a proper reservation of rights, the insured cannot
then so easily claim that it was prejudiced.” 85
78. Alison Frankel, New Illinois Supreme Court Ruling Should Make
‘Judicial
Hellhole’
Less
Fiery,
REUTERS
(Sept.
25,
2017),
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-illinois/new-illinois-supreme-courtruling-should-make-judicial-hellhole-less-fiery-idUSKCN1C02OC (stating that
nearly one-third of all asbestos litigation occurs in Madison County courts).
79. Sulphuric Acid Trading, 211 S.W.3d 243, 248 (Tenn. App. Ct. 2006)
(looking to Illinois case law on the APE in order to resolve a coverage dispute
governed by Tennessee authority because “[t]he parties and this Court have
been unable to locate any Tennessee authority discussing the Absolute
Pollution Exclusion contained in comprehensive general liability policies such
as the one at issue in the present case”).
80. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473 at 476.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The Koloms’ policy contained the following APE: “This insurance does
not apply to: f.(1) 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of actual,
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants: (a)
At or from premises you own, rent or occupy . . . ." Id. “Pollutants” were defined
in the policy as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” Id.
84. INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE MANAGEMENT TERMS
192 (9th ed. 2004) (defining a “reservation of rights as ‘[a]n insurer's notification
to an insured that coverage for a claim may not apply. Such notification allows
an insurer to investigate (or even defend) a claim to determine if coverage
applies (in whole or in part) without waiving its rights to later deny coverage
based on information revealed by the investigation’”).
85. Royal Ins. Co. v. Process Design Assoc., Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 966, 974
(1st Dist. 1991).
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Here is an example: if an insurer suspects that a reported loss
is not covered under the policy, the insurer would proceed under a
reservation of rights. The reservation of rights notifies the insured
that the insurer will thoroughly investigate and even defend the
claim, but the insurer reserves the right to disclaim coverage if it
eventually discovers circumstances that void or terminate
coverage.86 Although the reservation of rights protects the insurer
against waiving or estopping its rights under the policy, it did not
help the insurers in Koloms because the loss was covered.
Ultimately, the Koloms’ insurer was required to pay. The Illinois
Supreme Court found that the APE did not apply to the release of
carbon dioxide inside the building. 87 Since Koloms, lower Illinois
courts have used it as a rubric in a wide variety of pollution cases. 88
Recently, it has been cited as a way to resolve ambiguity in cases
involving permitted emissions.89 This comment proposes that
ambiguity in such cases be resolved in favor of coverage, as was the
case in Koloms.

E. Environmental Law
Because this comment will attempt to show that
environmental laws, such as permitting requirements, can have the
effect of rendering the APE ambiguous, this section introduces
pertinent environmental law. Pursuant to the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act and in compliance with the federal
Clean Air Act, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency is
authorized to issue operating permits for enterprises identified as
sources of air pollution.90 Permitting is also required, under Federal
and State law, for generators of hazardous waste. 91 As shall soon be
shown, the presence of these permits can preclude application of the
APE by introducing ambiguity into the insuring agreement. This
comment proposes that this ambiguity be resolved in favor of
coverage.

86. Conn. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Loop Paper Recycling, Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d
67, 69 (1st Dist. 2005) (noting that the insurer had agreed to defend its insured
but had reserved the right to deny coverage at a future date, i.e., after providing
a defense for the insured).
87. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473 at 494.
88. See Kim v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 770 (1st Dist.
2000) and Loop Paper, 356 Ill. App. 3d 67 (1st Dist. 2005) (applying and
interpreting Koloms).
89. See Country Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bible Pork, Inc., 2015 IL App (5th)
140211 (applying Koloms’ “traditional environmental pollution” standard to a
case involving a hog farm operating under a state environmental permit).
90. 415 ILCS 5/3.298.
91. Id. at § 3.370.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Outline of Analysis
Broadly speaking, Illinois courts interpret the APE to have the
effect of excluding coverage for “traditional environmental
contamination.”92 In Koloms, the Illinois Supreme Court reached
this conclusion to resolve the ambiguity that arises when the APE
is “applied to cases which have nothing to do with ‘pollution’ in the
conventional, or ordinary, sense of the word.”93 The Court found
support for this conclusion in the drafting history of the APE, noting
it had been drafted with the purpose of helping insurers avoid
liability for an “explosion of environmental litigation.” 94
Consequently, the Court restricted application of the APE to cases
involving traditional environmental pollution, which the Court
considered to be the problem the APE was intended to address. 95
Without explicitly stating how traditional environmental
pollution is to be defined, the Court nonetheless indicated that it
refers to the discharge of pollutants into or upon land, atmosphere,
or a body of water.96 The facts of the loss, such as the nature of the
injury and the scope of the pollution that caused it, is a primary
92. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494 (noting that “[g]iven the historical background
of the absolute pollution exclusion and the drafters' continued use of
environmental terms of art, we hold that the exclusion applies only to those
injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution. The accidental release
of carbon monoxide in this case, due to a broken furnace, does not constitute the
type of environmental pollution contemplated by the clause”).
93. Id. at 488.
94. Id. at 492-93 (explaining that its “review of the history of the pollution
exclusion amply demonstrates that the predominate motivation in drafting an
exclusion for pollution-related injuries was the avoidance of the ‘enormous
expense and exposure resulting from the 'explosion' of environmental
litigation.’. . . We think it improper to extend the exclusion beyond that arena.”)
(internal citations omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 493 (addressing an argument by the Koloms’ insurer, ASI, the
court states that “ASI submits that the deletion of the requirement that the
pollution be ‘[discharged] into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse
or body of water’ should be viewed by this court as a clear signal of the industry's
intent to broaden the exclusion beyond traditional environmental
contamination. We disagree.”).
Before the introduction of the APE in 1986, the standard pollution exclusion
from 1970 provided that
“[t]his policy shall not apply to bodily injury or property damage] arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental."
Id. at 491 (quoting from the standard-form pollution exclusion from 1970).
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factor Illinois courts consider in determining whether the APE
applies.97
However, Illinois courts have recently been confronted with an
additional factor to consider in the APE analysis: environmental
laws and regulations.98 Illinois courts must also consider
environmental permits as factors in determining the applicability
of the APE. There is some legitimate fear that it would be improper
to replace the words in an insurance policy with the words from an
environmental statute absent some manifestation of Congressional
intent. Nonetheless, as discussed in the analysis below, there are
indications that Illinois courts will consider environmental permits
in determining the applicability of the APE.

B. The APE Excludes Coverage for Losses Caused by
Traditional Environmental Pollution.
Koloms stands for the proposition that the APE excludes
coverage for losses caused by traditional environmental pollution. 99
The Court in Koloms reluctantly acknowledged that the literal
words of the exclusion seem to defeat coverage because of the broad

97. See, e.g., Loop Paper Recycling, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 67 (noting that
“[t]hough [it is] not explicitly stated in either Koloms or Kim, a primary factor
to consider in determining if an occurrence constitutes ‘traditional
environmental pollution’ and, thus; is not covered under an absolute pollution
exclusion, rests upon whether the injurious ‘hazardous material’ is confined
within the insured's premises or, instead, escapes into ‘the land, atmosphere, or
any watercourse or body of water’”) (comparing Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494
(accidental leak of CO2 within the building is not traditional environmental
contamination) with Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (discharge of hazardous
material into the soil is traditional environmental contamination)).
98. See, e.g. Bible Pork, 2015 IL App (5th) at 32-33 (noting that “all the
alleged injuries and damages came from Bible Pork's hog facility, which was
granted regulatory approval by the Department and forced to comply with the
requirements of the Act, as well as with numerous other state rules and
regulations, prior to becoming operational.”); see also Country Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Hilltop View, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 130124, ¶¶ 40-41 (explaining an insurers
use of an environmental regulatory definition of “air pollution” to disclaim
lawsuit liability coverage: “Country argues characterizing the neighbors' odor
claims as ‘traditional environmental pollution’ is consistent with the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act's (Act) treatment of odors as ‘air pollution.’ We
disagree. The Act does not classify all odors as ‘air pollution.’ Instead, the Act
defines ‘air pollution’ as ‘the presence in the atmosphere of one or more
contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration
as to be injurious to human, plant, or animal life, to health, or to property, or to
unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.’" (citation
omitted). The Act defines "contaminant" as "any solid, liquid, or gaseous matter,
any odor, or any form of energy, from whatever source." (citation omitted).
Even if the odors at issue in this case constituted air pollution for purposes
of the Act, this does not mean the odors constitute "traditional environmental
pollution.").
99. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 488.
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nature of the exclusion and its expansive definition of “pollutant.”100
However, the Court objected to this literal interpretation of the
policy language.101 The Supreme Court cited and quoted the
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Pipefitters
Welfare Education Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., which
states that “[w]ithout some limiting principle, the pollution
exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope and
lead to some absurd results.”102 The Seventh Circuit points out that
a strictly literal interpretation of the APE would exclude coverage
for injuries such as a slip-and-fall upon spilled Drano, or a reaction
to chlorine in a pool.103 Consider the hypothetical case involving the
spilled bleach above as another example: despite language which
unambiguously and literally excludes coverage, reasonable people
might disagree over whether it is pollution, and some might call the
description absurd. Thus, the facts of the loss can expose ambiguity
in the APE over whether or not there is in fact pollution.
In objecting to the literal interpretation of the APE, the Koloms
Court importantly noted that ambiguity tends to manifest when the
APE is applied in cases having nothing to do with what is ordinarily
thought of as pollution. 104 Rules of insurance policy construction
encourage interpretation against the drafter who is responsible for
an ambiguous word or phrase, which is often the insurer.105 In light
of the nature of the loss in Koloms, which involved injuries from the
release of gasses from a furnace, the Court was unwilling to simply
hold that coverage was defeated by the literal interpretation of the
APE.106 In effect, the Court found the APE to be ambiguous as
applied to the facts of Koloms, allowing it to reach a holding which
restricts application of the APE. Drawing support from the drafting
history of the APE, which illustrated attempts by the insurance
100. Id. (reasoning that “a purely literal interpretation of the disputed
language, without regard to the facts alleged in the underlying complaints, fails
to adequately resolve the issue presented to this court”).
101. Id. at 489 (citing, as an example of similar thinking, Minerva Enters.,
Inc. v Bituminous Cas. Corp., 312 Ark. 128 (1993)).
102. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d
1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
103. Id.
104. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 489 (reasoning that “[l]ike many courts, we are
troubled by what we perceive to be an overbreadth in the language of the
exclusion as well as the manifestation of an ambiguity which results when the
exclusion is applied to cases which have nothing to do with "pollution" in the
conventional, or ordinary, sense of the word”) (emphasis added) (citing Minerva
Enters., 312 Ark. at 851 (agreeing with the Plaintiff’s argument that the
definition of “pollutants” under an APE similar to that in Koloms was intended
to apply to industrial pollution and not household waste, and that the definition
was ambiguous).
105. Benjamin Moore, 179 N.J. at 95 n.3 (found in MARTINEZ AND
RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 142) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of contra
proferentem requires that an ambiguous provision of a written document "is
construed most strongly against the person who selected the language").
106. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 488.

2019]

Construing the Pollution Exclusion in Illinois

823

industry to stem the tide of potential liability arising from costly
environmental litigation, the Court reasoned that the APE, despite
its broad wording, was intended to protect insurers from liabilities
arising from traditional environmental contamination.107 This begs
the question of what exactly is meant by “traditional environmental
pollution.”

C. Traditional Environmental Pollution is the
Discharge of Pollutants into or Upon Land,
Atmosphere, or a Body of Water.
The Koloms Court did not offer much in the way of a definition
of traditional environmental pollution. It simply agreed with
another court’s finding that “any 'discharge, dispersal, release, or
escape' of a pollutant must be into the environment in order to
trigger the pollution exclusion clause and deny coverage to the
insured.”108 What the Supreme Court means is that the discharge
must be into or upon land, atmosphere, or a body of water. 109
Interestingly, this definition of traditional environmental
contamination is reminiscent of language that appeared in the
standard pollution exclusion, but was later deleted during the
drafting of the APE.110 The standard pollution exclusion in use
before the APE excluded coverage for discharges or pollutants into
the “air, water, or land.”111 The insurer in Koloms, ASI, argued that
the removal of this language from the APE signaled an intent by
the insurance industry to broaden the exclusion beyond traditional
107. Id. at 492-93.
108. Id. at 494 (quoting West Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring E., Inc., 104
N.C. App. 312 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that “[b]ecause the operative
policy terms 'discharge,' 'dispersal,' 'release,' and 'escape' are environmental
terms of art, the omission of the language 'into or upon land, the atmosphere or
any watercourse or body of water' in the new pollution exclusion is insignificant.
The omission of the phrase only removes a redundancy in the language of the
exclusion that was present in the earlier pollution exclusion clause.
Consequently, we find that any 'discharge, dispersal, release, or escape' of a
pollutant must be into the environment in order to trigger the pollution
exclusion clause and deny coverage to the insured.").
109. See, e.g., Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (noting that “the words ‘discharge,’
‘dispersal,’ ‘release,’ and ‘escape,’ . . . are terms of art used in environmental law
to indicate the release of hazardous material into the environment”).
110. Id.
111. 21-132 Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice Archive § 132.6 (2nd 2011)
(explaining that “[t]he standard ISO 1973 pollution exclusion eliminates
coverage under the comprehensive general liability policy (CGL) for damages
that arise out of the discharge of irritants, contaminants, or pollutants into the
air, water, or land, except when the discharge is “sudden and accidental”).
The exception for “sudden and accidental” discharges was litigated so
frequently that one commentator noted it may be “the most hotly litigated
insurance coverage question of the late 1980s.” Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492
(quoting J. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INS. CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY
FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 825 (1994)).
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environmental pollution.112 The Supreme Court recognized that the
language had been deleted, but characterized its deletion as the
elimination of a “redundancy,” noting the continued use of other
environmental terms of art like “discharge,” “release,” “escape,” and
“dispersal.”113 Thus, the inquiry into whether traditional
environmental pollution occurred, and subsequently whether the
APE applies, focuses in part on whether the injurious discharge was
into land, atmosphere, or a body of water.
As a general principle, if the discharge is limited to the inside
of a building, such as the hypothetical bleach spill, or the Koloms’
furnace gasses, then the APE is probably not triggered.114 This is
because there has been no discharge into or upon land, atmosphere,
or a body of water. In other words, if nothing has been released into
the environment because the discharge is contained within a
structure, then the APE is not triggered. If we were to tear up our
hypothetical bleach-damaged carpet and dump it in a wetland, or
vent the Koloms’ dysfunctional furnace to the outdoors, then we
have gotten closer to traditional environmental pollution, and
coverage may be defeated if injury or damages should arise. One of
the factors of the “traditional environmental pollution” test
mandated by Koloms is to distinguish between a discharge into the
environment, consisting of land, atmosphere, or bodies of water, and
a discharge inside of a building or within the insured premises. 115
The logic is attractively simple: a discharge indoors (or at least
completely contained on the insured property) is not pollution, but
a discharge outdoors may very well be pollution. In some cases, this
has made for an exceedingly straightforward and easy-to-apply
112. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 493 (explaining that ASI argued drafting changes
to the APE signaled an intent by the insurance industry to broaden the
exclusion beyond traditional environmental pollution).
113. Id. at 494 (explaining that “[t]he omission of the phrase only removes a
redundancy in the language of the exclusion that was present in the earlier
pollution exclusion clause”).
114. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Pharmasyn, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. (2d) 101000-U
(summarizing the holding of Koloms: “…the insurer's duty to defend was
triggered because the release of carbon monoxide inside a commercial building
did not constitute "traditional environmental pollution.") (emphasis added);
Loop Paper Recycling, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 81-82 (explaining that “for there to be
traditional environmental pollution, triggering the absolute pollution exclusion,
the pollutant must actually spill beyond the insured's premises and into the
environment.") (emphasis added).
115. Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (finding, after a lengthy discussion of
Koloms, that “the hazardous material [here]was not confined within the
cleaning company's building, unlike Koloms, but was discharged into the soil
underneath its dry cleaning and laundry store. The cleaning company's
discharge of a hazardous material into the soil meets the definition of
traditional environmental pollution. Thus, the cleaning company's resulting
injuries, specifically, the remediation costs, the removal and replacement of the
dry-cleaning equipment, the replacement of the store's floor and floor liner, and
lost profits, are excluded from coverage under the absolute pollution
exclusion.”).
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rule.
In Kim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Illinois First
District Appellate Court barred coverage for a dry cleaner whose
malfunctioning machinery caused the release of a chemical,
tetrachloroethane (also known as “perc”), into the land beneath the
building.116 Citing Koloms extensively, the First District
determined that the discharge of “hazardous materials,” i.e., perc,
into the land beneath the building was traditional environmental
pollution and, under Koloms, the APE applies to defeat coverage.117
Kim is the first in a line of First District cases that figure
importantly in Illinois’ APE jurisprudence, all building upon the
concept of traditional environmental pollution outlined by the
Supreme Court in Koloms.
In a subsequent case following the reasoning in Koloms and
Kim, Connecticut Specialty Insurance Company v. Loop Paper
Recycling, Inc., the First District, applying the APE, barred
coverage for personal injuries arising from a fire set by vandals
which caused the insured’s cardboard waste to burn for several
days, releasing a plume of smoke and other hazardous materials
into the air.118 The First District, as it did in Kim, frames its inquiry
as whether the injury-causing “hazardous material” is confined to
the insured’s premises or, instead, released into the land, air, or a
body of water.119 The language referring to “hazardous material”
appearing in Kim and Loop Paper, while undefined, is employed as
a catch-all term encompassing the pollutants, contaminants, and
irritants to which the APE applies.120 Kim and Loop Paper, building
upon Koloms, answers the question of whether an occurrence is
traditional environmental pollution (and consequently excluded
under the APE) by reference to the scope of the pollution.
In a more recent example of the First District Court of Appeal’s
approach to the APE, Village of Crestwood v. Ironshore Specialty
Insurance Co., the court applied the APE to defeat coverage for
injuries caused when the insured, Village of Crestwood, negligently
provided contaminated drinking water to its residents. 121 The
116. Id.
117. Id. at 777.
118. Loop Paper Recycling, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 67.
119. Id. at 81.
120. See, e.g., Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (noting that “the words ‘discharge,’
‘dispersal,’ ‘release,’ and ‘escape,’ . . . are terms of art used in environmental law
to indicate the release of hazardous material into the environment”); Loop Paper
Recycling, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 82 (explaining that “[b]ecause the underlying
complaint alleged that the hazardous material (toxic smoke containing
chemicals emitted from the burning cardboard) was not confined to the
Riverdale facility, but, instead, spread to the ‘surrounding neighborhoods,’ we
find that traditional environmental pollution occurred, i.e., hazardous material
discharged into the atmosphere, and that the policy's absolute pollution
exclusion barred coverage”).
121. Vill. of Crestwood v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 2013 IL App (1st)
120112,
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Village argued, somewhat spuriously, that the Koloms decision
meant coverage should only be excluded for entities that qualified
as “active polluters,” essentially meaning those that could be liable
for government clean-up costs.122 Koloms imposed no such
requirement.
The First District rejected the Village’s
characterization of Koloms, “[finding] no indication in the exclusion
itself or in precedent that the exclusion is limited to clean-up costs
imposed by environmental laws such as CERCLA.”123

D. Environmental Law a Factor to Consider in
Determining the Applicability of the APE.
APE litigators have tried, with mixed success, to tie application
of the APE to environmental statutes and regulations. In Country
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hilltop View, LLC, the Fourth District
Court of Appeals rejected application of the APE to bar coverage for
the defense of nuisance and negligence suits arising from the odor
and use of manure at the insured’s pig farm.124 The Fourth District,
citing Koloms, found that the odors and use of manure did not
constitute traditional environmental pollution.125 The insurer
argued that odors, such as those from pig farms, could be treated as
an “air pollutant” under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act,
and because of that can fairly be called traditional environmental
pollution.126 The Fourth District rejected this argument, noting that
the Act defines “air pollution” as the presence of quantities of
contaminates sufficient to cause injury or unreasonable
interference with the enjoyment of life or property, with

¶ 25.
122. Id. at ¶ 13 (explaining that “[a]ccording to the Village, Koloms
determined the underlying complaints must depict the Village as an ‘active
polluter’ or an entity that could be required to pay governmental clean-up costs
pursuant to an environmental law such as the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, which is commonly known
as CERCLA or the Superfund Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1980)”).
123. Id. at ¶ 20.
124. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilltop View, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 130124,
¶ 54. In another hog farm case, Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Silver Creek Pig,
Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57201 (C.D. Ill. 2015), the Illinois Central District
Court did not find the APE applicable to the negligent storage and land
application of odorous manure at the insured’s hog farm. Silver Creek Pig, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 36.
125. Hilltop, 2013 IL App (4th) at ¶ 37 (stating that “based on the allegations
in the neighbors' complaint, we do not find the hogs, their manure, nor the
smells associated with these things constitute traditional environmental
pollution”).
126. Id. at ¶ 40 (explaining that “Country [Mutual] argues characterizing
the neighbors' odor claims as "traditional environmental pollution" is consistent
with the Illinois Environmental Protection Act's (Act) treatment of odors as ‘air
pollution’”).
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“contaminates” defined to include “any odor.”127 The Fourth District
did not find the manure odor to be sufficient to cause injury.
Furthermore, the Fourth District noted that the statutory
definition of pollution employed today is considerably more
expansive than what the Supreme Court meant when it referred to
“traditional environmental pollution” in Koloms.128 Consequently,
adopting a statutory definition of pollution would greatly expand
the scope of activities subject to the APE, thus retroactively
modifying coverage under numerous contracts of insurance with the
stroke of a pen. Interestingly, the Fourth District describes hog
farms as traditional sources of food, and an example of a traditional
agricultural practice.129 Because of the traditional nature of pig
farming130, and the evolving notion of what constitutes a pollutant,
the Fourth District elected not to allow a statutory definition of
pollution to determine the applicability of the APE. 131 Doing so
would expose those engaged in traditional and important activities
like raising hogs to potentially ruinous liability, solely because of
the evolving nature of environmental regulation.
Yet Illinois courts are not wholly reluctant to draw from
statutory and regulatory authority in order to resolve coverage
disputes. Several courts have found that the APE is arguably
ambiguous as to whether permitted emissions constitute excluded
traditional environmental pollution. In Erie Insurance Exchange v.
Imperial Marble Corp., the Third District Court of Appeals ruled
the APE in the insured’s policy was ambiguous as to whether the

127. Id. (clarifying that “[t]he Act does not classify all odors as ‘air pollution.’
Instead, the Act defines ‘air pollution’ as ‘the presence in the atmosphere of one
or more contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and
duration as to be injurious to human, plant, or animal life, to health, or to
property, or to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.’
The Act defines ‘contaminant’ as "any solid, liquid, or gaseous matter, any odor,
or any form of energy, from whatever source.") (citing 415 ILCS 5/3.115 for the
definition of “air pollution” and 415 ILCS 5/3.165 for the definition of
“contaminant.”).
128. Id. at ¶ 41 (noting “…the scope of the things seen as hazardous to the
environment, as reflected in environmental protection laws today, is far greater
than what we conclude our supreme court had in mind when it spoke of
"traditional environmental pollution.").
129. Hilltop, 2013 IL App 1st 130124 at ¶ 42 (explaining that “[i]f anything
. . . the spreading of manure on farm fields is a traditional agricultural practice
and would not constitute ‘traditional environmental pollution.’”) (citing the
Livestock Management Facilities Act, 510 ILCS 77/1 – 77/999, which states that
"[t]he application of livestock waste to the land is an acceptable, recommended,
and established practice in Illinois. However, when livestock waste is not
applied in a responsible manner, it may create pollutional problems." 510 ILCS
77/20(f)).
130. Id. at ¶ 39 (noting that “[h]og farms have been around for a long time,
and neighbors of hog farms have dealt with the smells created by hog farms
ever since. These farms have been traditionally thought of as a source of food,
not pollution”).
131. Id. at ¶ 54.
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emissions of the insured’s manufacturing plant, permitted by an
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency permit, were traditional
environmental pollution.132 Resolving the ambiguity in favor of
coverage, the Third District noted that the Supreme Court in
Koloms had rejected a literal interpretation of an identical APE,
finding the exclusion ambiguous. 133 This ambiguity arises
regardless of the fact that, like the dry cleaner in Kim, the
hazardous materials in Erie escaped the insured’s premises and
entered the environment.134 This suggests a policy which favors
finding coverage for losses arising from permitted or otherwise
lawful pollution. Similarly, in Bible Pork, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals found an APE ambiguous as to whether emissions from a
permitted hog farm were traditional environmental contamination
and thus excluded by the APE. 135 Erie and Bible Pork show that a
consensus is emerging around the ambiguity of the APE when it is
applied to permitted emissions. 136 A new policy may be emerging,
one which would tend toward coverage in cases which implicate the
APE, but for the presence of a permit or other government
authorization to release pollutants. This leads to my proposal.

132. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Imperial Marble Corp., 957 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (3d
Dist. 2011) (deciding that “[t]he policy's pollution exclusion is arguably
ambiguous as to whether the emission of hazardous materials in levels
permitted by an IEPA permit constitute traditional environmental pollution
excluded under the policy”).
133. Id. (noting that “[i]n Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 489,
687 N.E.2d 72, 227 Ill. Dec. 149 (1997), the court rejected a literal interpretation
of a pollution exclusion that was identical to the provisions in the instant policy,
finding the exclusion ambiguous”).
134. Id. (surmising that “[i]n concluding that Erie did not owe Imperial a
duty to defend, the trial court relied on Loop Paper, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 67, and
considered that since Imperial's emissions migrated beyond its premises, they
constituted traditional environmental pollution and were excluded under the
policy. At this stage in the proceedings, it is not necessary to determine whether
Imperial's emissions constitute traditional environmental pollution. Rather, we
merely need to find that the policy's pollution exclusion is ambiguous as to this
issue.”).
135. Bible Pork, 2015 IL App (5th) at ¶ 43 (holding that “. . . the allegations
in the underlying complaint in the underlying lawsuit constituted a claim for
damages and set forth the elements necessary to trigger a duty to defend. We
further find that the pollution exclusions do not apply to abrogate Country
Mutual's duty to defend.”).
136. Id. at ¶ 41 (explaining that “[w]e also agree with Erie that the exclusion
is ambiguous because ‘[w]hen the allegations in the underlying complaint are
compared to the relevant provisions in the insurance [policies], it is unclear
whether permitted emissions constitute traditional environmental pollution
that is excluded.’”) (quoting Erie, 957 N.E.2d at 1221).
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. Narrative Outline of Proposal
This comment proposes that Illinois courts follow their peers
in the Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeals by recognizing that
the APE is ambiguous when applied to permitted emissions. This
proposal would have the effect of providing coverage for losses
arising from permitted emissions. The basic idea is that businesses
that operate lawfully under conditions determined by a regulatory
agency should be covered for suits alleging injury caused by their
permitted operations. In other words, if the State approves a pig
farm and grants it a permit, the farmer should have liability
insurance to protect her as she engages in her permitted business.
Her insurer should have to defend her if the neighbors sue alleging
the smell is pollution, or that runoff is polluting neighboring farms.
Construing the APE to be ambiguous when applied to
permitted emissions is firmly rooted in the methods commonly used
to interpret insurance policies. One method which comports with
this proposal is the doctrine of contra proferentum as discussed
above. The doctrine of contra proferentum is frequently used to
settle insurance coverage disputes over ambiguous exclusions in
favor of the insured.137 Furthermore, construing the APE to be
ambiguous when applied to permitted emissions is consistent with
the line of Illinois APE cases beginning with Koloms. These cases
consistently identify ambiguities where there is a question as to
whether the APE applies. The Koloms cases also consistently
resolve ambiguities in favor of insureds where there is an APE
question.
Other states have looked favorably upon Illinois’ approach to
APE issues. This should encourage courts of the workability of
Illinois’ approach. California, known for promoting policies that
protect the environment and the people of California138, has adopted
an interpretation of the APE that is explicitly modeled on Illinois’
interpretation.139 Ohio, too, has cited Koloms favorably and adopted
137. See Founders Ins. Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (2010) (explaining
that contract interpretation rules govern the interpretation of insurance
policies because insurance policies are contracts, and that ambiguous policy
provisions are interpreted in favor of coverage); See also Benjamin Moore, 179
N.J. at 95 n.3 (found in MARTINEZ AND RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 142 (noting
that “[t]he doctrine of contra proferentem requires that an ambiguous provision
of a written document is construed most strongly against the person who
selected the language")).
138. American readers are likely aware of the familiar disclaimer seen on
products as variable as artificial sweetener and glassware: “This product
contains chemicals known to the State of California to cause cancer and birth
defects or other reproductive harm.” Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1986, Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.5 et seq.
139. Compare MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 31 Cal. 4th 635, 653 (Cal.
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a similar interpretation of the APE.140
Moreover, construing the APE to be ambiguous as applied to
permitted emissions makes for sound public policy. This proposal
places the burden of insuring polluters where it belongs: on
polluters themselves and their insurers. This shifts the burden from
the environment and the public to those responsible for the
pollution. This proposal protects and promotes the public health
and welfare, and it provides a bright-line rule for the insurance
industry. Bright-line rules benefit the industry because they allow
for certainty when pricing risk and coverage.

B. Construing the APE as Ambiguous when Applied to
Permitted Emissions is Consistent with Principles of
Insurance Policy Interpretation
As discussed above, ambiguous exclusions in insurance policies
are typically interpreted against the drafting party, which is
typically the insurer.141 This is reflected in the frequent application
of the doctrine of contra proferentum to settle insurance coverage
disputes. Because the doctrine is well-recognized in the context of
insurance coverage litigation, it is appropriately applied in the
context of APE litigation. Therefore, it is consistent with the
principles of insurance policy interpretation to construe the APE to
be ambiguous when applied to permitted emissions.
At least one court has expressed discomfort with allowing
environmental statutes and regulations to color the interpretation
of an insurance policy. The trial court in Erie, which held that the
APE did apply to exclude coverage for losses caused by permitted
emissions, expressed discomfort with employing statutory or
regulatory conceptions of pollution in the interpretation of a policy
2003) (holding, among other things, that the APE refers to “conventional
environmental pollution”), with Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494 (holding that the APE
refers to “traditional environmental pollution”). See also Am. Cas. Co. of
Reading, PA v. Miller, 159 Cal. App. 4th 501 (2008).
MacKinnon presents a lengthy summary of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
discussion of the history of the APE in Koloms. Koloms itself is cited extensively
throughout MacKinnon. Most importantly, the California Supreme Court
ultimately adopts a formulation of the APE (excluding “conventional
environmental pollution”) that is very similar to Illinois’ (excluding “traditional
environmental pollution”). This lends support to the notion that Illinois’
interpretation of the APE matters, and that it is in a position to set standards
in this area.
140. Andersen v. Highland House Co., 93 Ohio St. 3d 547, 551-52 (2001).
141. See Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d at 433 (explaining that contract interpretation
rules govern the interpretation of insurance policies because insurance policies
are contracts, and that ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted in favor of
coverage); See also Benjamin Moore, 179 N.J. at 95 n.3 (found in MARTINEZ AND
RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that “[t]he doctrine of contra
proferentem requires that an ambiguous provision of a written document is
construed most strongly against the person who selected the language")).
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of insurance.142 This is a legitimate concern, but the more important
concern is ambiguity. The ambiguity in the permitted emissions
cases does not turn on the definition of pollution employed by this
or that regulatory agency. It turns on the far simpler question of
whether permitted emissions caused a loss that could be excluded
under the APE. It is this question that raises the latent ambiguity
of the APE, and not the more esoteric inquiry into the statutory and
regulatory definitions of pollution. Also, it is noteworthy that the
Fourth Circuit expressed no discomfort with analyzing and
comparing a statutory definition of pollution against that employed
in the APE, and even entertained an insurer’s argument that the
statutory definition should inform the policy definition.

C. Construing the APE as Ambiguous when Applied to
Permitted Emissions is Based on Sound Public
Policy
The APE should be construed to be ambiguous as applied to
permitted emissions for reasons of sound public policy. This is
because permitted emissions are themselves creatures of policy.
The purpose of using permits is to prevent excessive amounts of
pollution by balancing the benefits of industry against the costs of
pollution.143 Permitting thus represents an attempt by policy
makers to strike a balance between industry and society. This
balance should be considered when it is applicable to the APE
142. Erie, 957 N.E.2d at 1218 (explaining that “[t]he trial court . . . found
that it was inappropriate to replace the language in the policy's pollution
exclusion with the definition of pollution under the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the IEPA. The trial court
stated: ‘I think the Complaint itself, which is the underlying issue here, filed by
the citizens, is alleging contamination, noxious odors, etcetera, and that's
enough to constitute traditional environmental pollution.’”).
143. See, e.g., S. Ill. Asphalt Co. v. EPA, 15 Ill. App. 3d 66, 79 (5th Dist.
1973) (stating, in dicta, that “. . . the purpose of requiring an installation permit
is merely to prevent the possibility of air pollution from a plant which might,
when operated, cause such pollution”). See also 415 ILCS 5/9.1(a):
“The General Assembly finds that the federal Clean Air Act, as amended,
and regulations adopted pursuant thereto establish complex and
detailed provisions for State-federal cooperation in the field of air
pollution control, provide for a Prevention of Significant Deterioration
program to regulate the issuance of preconstruction permits to insure
that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the
preservation of existing clean air resources, and also provide for plan
requirements for nonattainment areas to regulate the construction,
modification and operation of sources of air pollution to insure that
economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the goal of
achieving the national ambient air quality standards, and that the
General Assembly cannot conveniently or advantageously set forth in
this Act all the requirements of such federal Act or all regulations which
may be established thereunder.” (emphasis added).
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coverage analysis. It seems uncontroversial to say that emissions of
the kind regulated by permitting agencies are pollution. What is
less clear is whether it is appropriate to use the “traditional
environmental pollution” test from the line of cases beginning with
Koloms when referring to emissions that are within permissible
standards set by a regulatory agency or legislative body. A hyperliteral application of the test would result in a lack of coverage for
emissions that are permitted by policy. Insurance coverage disputes
should not be resolved against the interests of a recognized public
policy.144
Shifting from a fact-specific inquiry, such as the kind
undertaken in cases like Koloms, Kim, Loop Paper, and Crestwood,
to a more generalized policy inquiry into whether the pollutant at
hand is permitted or otherwise authorized would allow courts to
find the APE to be ambiguous.145 Once a finding of ambiguity has
been reached, the ambiguous provision can be interpreted against
the drafting insurance company. This provides a path to coverage
for permitted emissions. Losses arising from permitted emissions
which implicate the APE would therefore be covered. The fact-based
analysis attendant to the traditional environmental pollution test
should yield a softer, policy-based analysis in cases where the
injurious pollutant is permitted or otherwise authorized by statute
or regulation.
This proposal does not answer the question of whether
permitted emissions, those allowed under State and Federal law by
merit of an operating or construction permit, are in fact “traditional
environmental pollution” and thus excluded by the APE. There is a
latent ambiguity in the APE when it is applied to losses involving
permitted emissions.146 It is the view of this comment that this
ambiguity means permitted emissions could fairly be called
traditional environmental pollution or nothing of the sort. As
discussed above and below, ambiguity in an insurance policy is
construed against the drafter and in favor of coverage. Illinois
144. Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., 223 Ill. 2d 407, 417
(Ill. 2006) (explaining that “[w]here the provisions of a policy are clear and
unambiguous, they will be applied as written unless doing so would violate
public policy”) (internal citations omitted).
145. Strictly adhering to the traditional environmental pollution test
employed in Koloms, Kim, Loop Paper, and Crestwood would cut in favor of
finding that permitted emissions are excluded by the APE. Illinois courts have
been reluctant to do this.
146. See Erie, 957 N.E.2d at 1221 (explaining that “[w]hen the allegations
in the underlying complaint are compared to the relevant provisions in the
insurance [policies], it is unclear whether permitted emissions constitute
traditional environmental pollution that is excluded”). See also Bible Pork, 2015
IL App (5th) 140211, ¶ 41 (explaining that “[w]e also agree with Erie that the
exclusion is ambiguous because ‘[w]hen the allegations in the underlying
complaint are compared to the relevant provisions in the insurance [policies], it
is unclear whether permitted emissions constitute traditional environmental
pollution that is excluded’”) (quoting Erie, 957 N.E.2d at 1221).
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courts strongly favor finding coverage during coverage disputes,
even if there is not an official policy favoring coverage in Illinois.147
It is good policy to cover damages and injuries arising from
permitted emissions because it provides a remedy for harm caused
by permissible emissions. Furthermore, this policy smooths the
contradiction between permitting emissions while excluding
coverage for injuries arising from permitted emissions. If the
emissions have been deemed permissible by a regulatory agency,
but insurers are allowed to exclude coverage for injuries alleged to
have arisen from the same permitted emissions, then there is a gap
in coverage that contradicts the purpose of both environmental
permitting and liability insurance. We, as a society, want
businesses to get permits, and we also want them to have insurance.
Under the current regime, businesses may be inclined to forego one
or the other. Why pay for insurance that doesn’t cover your
operations? Conversely, why get a permit that will pigeon-hole you
as a “polluter” and void your insurance coverage? It makes good
sense from a policy perspective to cover damages and injuries
arising from permitted emissions because it smooths out a
contradiction that effectively creates a gap in coverage for activities
that are both permitted and beneficial.

V.

CONCLUSION

This comment reviewed Illinois’ interpretation of the APE.
Authority governing the applicability of the APE is highly
fragmented, but Illinois is a larger and more important fragment in
this fragmentation of authority. The state-centric system of
insurance regulation codified by the McCarran-Ferguson Act has
ensured that States take the lead on insurance regulation. Since
Illinois is a leader in the insurance industry and insurance
litigation, its interpretation of the APE influences other
jurisdictions. Indeed, even California, with stringent environmental
policies and pro-consumer approach, has adopted Illinois’
interpretation of the APE.
As we have seen, the Illinois APE operates to exclude bodily
injury or property damage resulting from the release of pollutants.
147. Yamada Corp. v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 362,
370-71 (noting that “. . . there is no public policy in Illinois ensuring that there
is insurance coverage for insureds and injured third parties. Admittedly, Illinois
courts liberally construe the insurance policy and the underlying complaint in
favor of the insured when determining the duty to defend. Federated Mut. Ins.
Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 716, 725 (2d Dist. 1996).
Similarly, Illinois courts liberally construe any doubts as to coverage in favor of
the insured, especially when the insurer seeks to avoid coverage based on an
exclusion in the policy. Oakley Transp., Inc. v. Zurich Insur. Co., 271 Ill. App.
3d 716, 722 (1995). Conversely, courts should not torture the language of a
policy to find coverage where none clearly exists. Cohen Furniture Co. v. St.
Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 214 Ill. App. 3d 408, 411 (3d Dist. 1991).”).
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This is because the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the APE
to apply to “traditional environmental pollution,” which is the
discharge of pollutants into or upon the land, air, or a body of water.
Moreover, when a pollutant is discharged into or upon the land, air,
or a body of water, but under a lawful environmental permit, Illinois
courts have been reluctant to apply the APE (and thus disclaim
coverage). This is due to the principle of contra proferentem, which
favors coverage where ambiguities exist.
Several Illinois courts have found that the APE is ambiguous
as to whether it applies to permitted emissions. This comment
proposes that other Illinois courts recognize this ambiguity and
follow the principles of insurance by interpreting the ambiguity in
favor of coverage. This proposal is consistent with rules of insurance
policy interpretation. It is also based on sound public policy for the
insurance industry and the environment. We can tell partly because
other states have begun following Illinois’ interpretation of the
APE. Lastly, and most importantly, this proposal is consistent with
the interpretation of the APE set forth by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Koloms and subsequent cases. For the foregoing reasons,
Illinois Courts, and ultimately the Illinois Supreme Court, should
formally recognize that the APE is ambiguous as applied to
permitted or otherwise authorized emissions.

